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Thursday, March 6, 2008

Is Japan Resisting?

by Claus Vistesen: Copenhagen, (Cross-post from Alpha.Sources)

There is only one thing which you can be certain of these days. Trying to keep up with the pace of record breaking and nail biting pieces of data pouring in at the moment carries with it a distinct risk of suffering a heart attack. You shouldn't worry too much about the author of this space though but I am merely pointing towards the fact that 'keeping up' these days is akin to the work of a certain Sisyphus. This time I will be moving in with an addition to my ongoing coverage of Japan; for the most recent posts see here and here. Three, more or less, separate issues will be covered. We will have a look at the traditional charts of domestic consumption and prices and we will also take a look at the situation of the BOJ. What are we likely to see on the interest rate front and equally important how will the economic situation interact with the switch of guards at the BOJ? Lastly, we will look at the Yen and more specifically the USD/JPY. The 105 mark has been well and truly breached and now we are holding our breath for the potential of 100 which will be the real test for intervention. Remember that most of the charts below only go as far as January which of course is somewhat backward looking. I will be adding newer information where applicable.

The inflation and subsequent outlook does not seem to have changed much in Japan. Food and energy still keep the Japanese core inflation in the positive at an annual increase just shy of 1%. The core-of-core index meanwhile remained in negative trajectory. The lack of pass through to prices ex energy and food is a bit surprising at this point but clearly underpins the point that Japan currently is subjected to cost-push inflation rather than demand-pull inflation. I do expect however that prices at some point will move into positive territory even in connection to the core-of-core index. The main point tas always is the extent to which the price increases don't follow the economic dynamics akin to a recovery but rather the resemblance of a supply shock. Essentially, this is all a question of where in the value chain the inflation will show up. So far, companies outside the food sector do not seem to have had the incentive to pass on higher input prices to the extent that these are pushing on margins. In general such a fence won't hold forever of course. Traditional economic dynamics prescribe that this ultimately will end up at the consumers' door either in the form of increasing prices (reduced purchasing power) or cutting of activity which would translate into rising unemployment or an even stronger shift towards part time employment in Japan's case. In this specific context I think it would serve us well to look at some graphs of input prices in the form of import prices and the corporate goods index.

The first graph may of course be riddled with exchange rate effects and I realise that I am on shaky grounds given the fact that I am not completely on top of the methodology. Yet, we should still be able to extract some interesting information from this, not least the confirmation of the well known point that energy seem to be main driver of rising import prices and thus to some extent input prices. This is important in Japan's case since she is a major food and energy importer. The corporate goods index is more interesting I think. If we look at the aggregate index it is virtually flat (with a clear upward bias) which suggests that price pressures in Japan are not as widespread as many claim. Once again though we see that energy prices (proxied by petroleum and coal) have shot up significantly in the past 5-6 months confirming the initial message from core prices. Turning to consumer spending we got some rather interesting news lately which points to the fact that consumer spending cannot be deployed as a particularly strong indicator of the Japanese business cycle even if it may be interesting in and of itself. We consequently observed that Japanese consumers did not merely end 2007 on a strong note but started 2008 even stronger with household spending climbing an annual 3.6%. Many explanations have been offered as to why household spending can continue to climb even as general economic indicators and confidence indices are moving in opposite territory. For the concrete January reading anecdotal evidence of consumers indulging on new car models seem to coincide well with spending on 'automobiles' climbing a pretty clip. However, if we deviate a bit from the details Ken Worsley makes the following interesting point ...

Perhaps we’re finding out more as to why Japanese households are saving less and less money…

This thus takes us into the whole discussion of dissaving and how Japan as an old society will tend to dissave (although the precise dynamics here should not be considered linear). The merits of discussing this on the basis of one month's reading are non-existing but it is still an interesting point to have knocking around even if I personally think that it might not be a fitting description of the process we are seeing. Generally, the long term index I am also fielding should be able to aid us since it demonstrates how real consumption is clearly above trend at this point and given the underlying dynamics I don't expect this to be sustainable. Another trend to watch in this respect is the extent to which the recent pick-up in wage growth will be sustained. Moreover, and in order to provide you with a more precise indicator of where the Japanese train is heading the most recent reading on industrial production indicates that things are definitely slowing down in Japan. The index was down on a m-o-m basis and the corresponding figure for the annual increase, although up, does indeed indicate that the general pace is easing. All this also seems to confirm what Takehiro Sato pointed out a couple of weeks back ...

We are forecasting that Japan will cling on to a modicum of growth in the Oct-Dec 2007 quarter, boosted by external demand, but there is a possibility that, like the US, that quarter will mark the peak and the economy will retreat in Jan-Mar. Future data for industrial production will tell us if this is the case.

Lastly, we also learned a couple of days ago that capital spending was revised down sharply in Q4 confirming my initial hunch at the time that this figure was far outside the realms of reality. In conclusion, the economic indicators are still pointing towards a significant slowdown in Japan. Save the recent pick-up in household spending I have not seen any indications that counters the fundamental point that Japan's much hailed recovery is in for a real test.

This then brings us into policy issues and more specifically whether the BOJ is going to move in with a cut in the already pretty trimmed refi rate of 0.5%. The important point to emphasise is that the decision to take it to 0.25% is likely to be just as much a question of politics than economics, at least in the short term. Consequently, and as I have also been pointing to in my previous notes the coming change of guards at the BOJ tend to cloud the setting in which future decisions are to be made not to speak of the decision itself. Japanese politics are not my speciality by any yardstick but the state of play still seems to be the one I have emphasised. The ruling party (the Liberal Democratic Party - LPD) is trailing in the public's glance after a series of political scandals and the opposition (the Democratic Party of Japan - DPJ) who holds the majority in the upper house may want to exploit this by thwarting the LPD's proposal for a governor and thus, most likely, provoking a general election. As Ken Worsley (see link above) details this has led to a number of those backroom negotiations in order to reach a formal agreement in order to avoid a potential rout on open screens. The main conflict is that the LPD's main candidate for the job, the current Deputy Governor Toshiro Muto, is not exactly to the liking of the DPJ. The question now seems to be the extent to which the political parties will risk leaving the BOJ without leadership come the 20th of March when Fukui's mandate expires. I am moving in behind Ken Worsley here as I doubt this would be the case but the risk to this is that the DPJ is bend hell on provoking an election. If this is the case, anything can happen. In the context of what this political charade will mean for policy decisions it is not easy to call, to say the least. Takehiro Sato from Morgan Stanley fields some extensive musings on the topic as he tries to argue why Morgan Stanley still sees the BOJ moving to 0.25% in H01-2008 at the same time as he hedges himself with a handful of put options. The interesting thing is that Sato largely bases his forecast on the extent to which Muto is selected as governor. According to Sato Muto would be more inclined to move in with a cut than the new contester on the arena Former Deputy Governor Yutaka Yamaguchi. All this of course is pretty much speculation at this point. I maintain my view that Q2 2008 will see a cut to 0.25% and behind Sato's hedges I see this as Morgan Stanley's main call too. I think that economic fundamentals will, after all, be the guiding driving force noting alongside Sato that April's Outlook Report (i.e. under the new governor) will be very important in this context.

The final topic I promised to deal with was the topic of the Yen and of course more specifically the extent to which we will see intervention in the USD/JPY as the pair drifts towards 100. The myopic focus on the USD/JPY is not really fair. It is important to understand what drives the Yen at the moment which alongside the other low-yielder Mr. CHF is driven by risk sentiment and thus the unwinding/'winding' of carry trade. Carry trade as we know it in the good old days is of course over at this point in time. But the Yen and the CHF still seems to be, for the moment at least, correlated with movements in equities and as such the general risk aversion argument. Obviously, as Macro Man neatly notes in his recent take on the markets the USD is now itself moving in to a territory where it is likely to be used as a funding currency for carry trades, especially since the Yen/CHF funded carry trade is pretty much out at this point even to such an extent that some are worrying about a rapid unwind.

With real two year govvy yields of -2.7%, why would anyone in their right mind hold dollars? The carry trade is alive and well (just see where AUD and NZD and BRL are trading!) but this time around, it's funded in dollars and not yen.


MM's mentioning of the negative real yields on two year government bonds is important I think and I do believe that fixed income markets in general need to be watched at this point in time since there is a lot of need for funding out there but not a lot of buyers. This is important in a Japanese context too since they have a government deficit to finance and even though the demand for Japanese instruments perhaps are not in jeopardy in the current environment (i.e. investors prefer low but secure yield to high insecure yield; i.e. the risk aversion punt) I still think that Japan is on the front row in a potential crisis in fixed income since the funding need is so damn large. Meanwhile, the USD/YEN continues to break new lows and the hitherto 105 mark mentioned as a potential limit for the BOJ/MOF has not so far prompted open market intervention. Let us look at the graphical version;

As Macro Man smugly noted a couple of weeks ago in the context of waiting for ECB's decision to lower rates it might be like Waiting for Godot. I am beginning to think that the same may apply to the USD/JPY and the probability of intervention from the BOJ/MOF. As I have persistently arguing on this point the 100 mark is the real test here. I am not certain that 100 will see intervention but for political as well as more 'animal spirity' reasons I do think that it is pretty close call. Such things are of course impossible to call and we could also ask the question of whether the USD/JPY will hit 100 at all? Given the current momentum against the USD I think this is very likely. In this context, it remains to be seen what a cut to 0.25% would actually do. Fundamental analysis would prescribe that the JPY should weaken on the back of such a move but this is not at all clear at this point. In fact, in the current environment I am not sure that investors are ready to sell the JPY to a great extent an thus revive the carry trade à la traditionelle even if only for a moment. A (short) burst in the form of an equity rally or above par news from the US and (paradoxically) the Japanese economy could bring the USD/JPY back up towards the 110 mark. For the immediate future I see the main bias as supportive for further Yen strength.

In Conclusion

A lot of ground was covered in this note. The situation and outlook on prices have not changed much since I last had Japan under the spot light. Inflation remains in positive territory driven by energy and food prices whereas the core-of-core continued to decline -0.1% for January. This mismatch is the one to watch for the immediate future. Companies are clearly passing on prices on food and energy price pass through is also given. However, what remains to be seen is the extent to which cost-push inflation will hit a wider array of prices in Japan; so far this has not been the case. Almost all economic indicators are still pointing towards a rather abrupt slowdown in Japan. Only data from household spending and a much welcome increase in wages seem to defy the general tendency. The recent revision of Q4 capex and the slump in industrial production in January confirm my overall bias for a near recessionary environment. In light of this economic environment I see the BOJ cutting to 0.25% in Q2 although I don't think it will happen tomorrow (Friday the 7th). The political quagmire is a potential risk here. All things point towards Muto being appointed unless the DPJ decides to follow through and veto in which case a battle of wills will ensue. In the event of a stalemate I would expect a freeze of policy moves which could shatter my forecast as well as of course a sudden pick-up in economic activity could do the same. Finally, I took a look at the Yen and more specifically the probability of a USD/JPY intervention at 100. I am not convinced that it would happen but I contend that this is a magic number if ever there was one so this will be a close call. If economic conditions continue to deteriorate I see the probability of intervention increasing as the USD/JPY drifts towards 100. Meanwhile the JPY seems to be driven by risk sentiment and thus the reversal of carry trades. A cut to 0.25% suggests a weakening but I am unsure that the JPY will respond to fundamentals at this juncture.

Wednesday, March 5, 2008

Romania GDP Q4 2007 - Evident Signs of Strong Overheating

by Edward Hugh: Barcelona

Romania's economic expansion accelerated in the last quarter of last year, raising expectations of further interest rate increases from the central bank in an attempt to contain a strong upward movement in inflation which has been fuelled by a Romanian government increase in end of year spending and a steady household consumption boom. Gross domestic product (according to preliminary data, fuller details on March 12th) rose at an annual rate 6.6 percent in the fourth quarter, the fastest since the last quarter of 2006, and up from 5.7 percent in the previous quarter according to data released by the National Statistics Institute (INSSE) on Tuesday.




Romania's entry to the European Union on Jan. 1 2007 has seen a sharp increase in foreign investment and inflow of bank funds (and remittances as Romania's workers have moved abroad), and all of this has served to boost wages, lending and consumption to rates which are hard for the Romanian economy to absorb and sustain. Around 10% of Romania's workforce of around 10 million are currently working outside the country (largely in Italy and Spain), and of course many of these potential workers who have been lost are skilled and in the most economically productive age groups.

Spain and Italy have in fact been the principal destinations for Romanian migrants, athough surprisingly, and as can be seen in the Spain chart below, far from attempting to actually measure the extent of the problem, the official data - which only identifies those who have formally declared themselves to be permanent migrants - bears little relation to reality. According to the Spainsh national institute of statistics, the number of Romanians in Spain has increased in the following fashion in rcent years:



More detailed explanation of this phenomenon can be found in this post). The number of Romanians in Italy has also increased dramatically as the following chart from the Italian statistics office makes clear.



The problem is that while all these Romanians may be working out of the country, they are at the same time busily sending remittances home, and these remittances in their turn only serve to fuel domestic demand even further. Basically it is hard to get an accurate picture of the actual volume of remittances which are being sent home. One estimate comes from the World Bank, who openly recognise that what they provide is absolute minimum data. Noththeless, and even if the true numbers do not accelerate quite as sharply as the IMF data seem to show (which may be rather an indication of better data in more recent years), a sharp uptick has obviously taken place.



Another way of looking at the remittances issue is to take the current transfers item in the monthly balance of payments data published by the National Bank of Romania, and since this shows a rather smoother upward curve, and one which seems to be closer to the actual pattern of migrant outflow, perhaps it gives us a better general indication.



While such data is of limited validity in absolute terms - since it includes other kinds of transfer - in relative terms it can give us a much better appreciation of how the remittances situation has evolved over the years than the World Bank data can.

Be all this as it may, the world bank estimate the 2006 volume of remittances to have amounted to some 4.1% of GDP, and that is very large, and with significant macroeconomic consequences as we are currently seeing. I think what no-one had thought about before all this started happening over Eastern Europe was the way in which these remittances could be treated as an income stream and used to finance mortgage borrowing to fuel construction, with all the distortionary consequences we are now observing. Basically, the lesson from Romania (and elsewhere in the CEE) has to be that if you have very low fertility over a long period you certainly cannot live by exporting labour in the same way that high fertility societies like Philippines, Pakisatn or Ecuador do.




Signs of Overheating Everywhere

As a result of these pressures on capacity, Romanian inflation accelerated to 7.3 percent in January (up from 6.6 percent in December). Obviously the National Bank of Romania now looks set to raise and raise its main interest rate throughout the first half of this year.



More strength to their elbow will come from this weeks PPI reading which showed that producer-price growth in January accelerated for the fifth consecutive month, reaching an annual rate of 13 percent, the fastest pace since August of 2006, according to a separate INSSE report today.



The central bank raised its main interest rate to 9 percent from 8 percent at its last meeting on Feb. 4. This was the third consecutive increase, and the bank cited "inflationary pressures that have been amplified by persistent excess demand as a consequence of strong wage increases and fast growth of credit to the private sector".



The central bank next meets on March 26 to discuss its main interest rate.

One of the problems they will need to be thinking about is private indebtedness since this grew an annual rate of 66.8% percent in January, while foreign exchange loans to households grew at an astonishing and alarming 143.4% annual rate.



At the same time net monthly wages have been rising rapidly, with the rate slowing slightly in December but still increasing at an annual rate of around 15 percent.




Further indication of the kind of overheating which is currently going on can be found in the fact that retail sales grew in December at an annual rate of 20 percent in December while the construction industry increased its activity by 28 percent on the year.





Central Bank Double Bind and Currency Risk


In the face of all of this it is evident that the Romanian central bank will continue to increase its benchmark lending rate, which is already the highest in the European Union. The question is, what will be the objective of these increases? If we look over our shoulders a little to see what has been happening in Hungary, we can begin to see that the Romanian central bank will now be increasingly faced with conflicting policy objectives. Looking just a little further ahead - oh why is it that so many people have so much difficulty seeing what must be coming only round the next corner - at some point what can't continue won't, bank lending criteria will change (indeed it may well already be doing so, since only last week Hungarian mortgage bank OTP announced it was ceasing to offer unsecured loans in the Romanian market due to the high level of loan delinquency) and overheating will transform itself into its opposite, "rapid overcooling", or engine seize-up if you prefer (as we are now seeing in the Baltics).

At this point the central bank will face a dilema: whether to lower interest rates to give support to what at that point will be crumbling internal demand, or to pump rates up to defend the currency given the level of exposure to foreign currency loans. There are already signs that just this development may now be taking place. The leu has been under almost continuous downward pressure since last August (see chart below) and JPMorgan Chase are now predicting that by the end of the second quarter the central bank will need to raise its Monetary Policy Rate by at least 1 percentage point to 10 percent simply to keep the leu from dropping to the "never mind the quality feel the pain" level of 4 per euro. This point was made by Miroslav Plojhar, an emerging-market economist with JP Morgan in London in a client note earlier this week.






"Problems in the financial markets can cause banks, mainly in Central Europe, to cut credit lines causing problems in financing the current-account deficit and sparking a sell-off in the leu....The fuse needed for it keeps getting shorter" Plojhar said.

I would add to the problems in financial markets the issue of fears about levels of exposure as tthe overheating turns into its opposite, and the currency exposure of Romanian clients starts to mount. Certainly few would want to repeat the experience the Swedish banks appear to be starting to have as a result of the lending practices of their subsidiaries in the Baltics.

Conclusion. Romania is overheating strongly, not far from a "correction", and needs watching carefully from now on.

References

More details about Romanian background demography can be found in my Romanian Demongraphy at a Glance post,

more details on the argument about catch up growth, overheating and demographics can be found in Claus Vistesen's Catch Up Growth and Demographics post,

and some more elaboration of the central argument in this post can be found in my Alarm Bells Ringing in Romania post.