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Showing posts with label Emerging Markets. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Emerging Markets. Show all posts

Tuesday, June 5, 2007

Ageing and Financial Markets - Going for Yield?

By Claus Vistesen: Copenhagen

Financial markets have evolved with breathtaking pace in the last decade. In what follows I will both attempt to sketch an outline of the bigger picture and I try to pinpoint the effect of ageing on financial markets. This task entails a broad view on many of the major participants in today's rapidly evolving financial markets as well as demanding sensitivity towards the fact that ageing is only one of many factors which affect financial markets in the medium to long run. Consequently, the impact of ageing on financial markets involves musings on longer term dynamics which are essentially, I would say, very difficult to predict even for the most ardent analyst. However, I will argue with some force that before we reach the state of 'rapid dissaving' which many analysts hold to be the end point in terms of ageing, it seems as if the main dictum for global markets, at least for a somewhat prolonged period, could ultimately add up to one thing: too much liquidity chasing too little yield, a reality not entirely caused by, but rather somehow exacerbated by, ageing. My account begins with a brief discussion of a hypothesis recently proposed by Morgan Stanley's Stephen Jen concerning a global asset shortage. The discussion will unfold in the context of equities and sovereign debt* before moving on to a discussion on how households and thus the agers themselves - represented in all this by the so-called retail investors - might act to affect global financial capital markets.

Sovereign Debt - Enough Assets to go Around?

As noted above, Stephen Jen has recently suggested that the world is suffering from a shortage of financial assets relative to evolving demand. Jen especially notes that the recent decade - which has been caharcterised by comparatively high rates of economic growth and 'relatively' modest pressures on governments to resort to heavy-duty counter cyclical fiscal policy (Japan and Italy excluded) - has seen the supply of sovereign debt dwindle. Notional empirical evidence seems to support Jen's hypothesis on sovereign debt as the total world sovereign debt oustanding relative to world GDP stagnated in 1997 at a ratio of about 75%. In short; there is not enough sovereign debt in the world to satisfy demand - a feature which also subsequently lies behind the 'conundrum' of low bond yields. Yet, all this simply begs the question of what drives the supply of sovereign debt in the longer run. According to Jen, one of the drivers of the low supply of sovereign debt relative to demand has been the relative buoyant global growth rate which suggests that if global growth (or growth in key global economies?) begins to falter the supply of sovereign debt should begin to nudge back up. Yet, is this plausible? The first point here of note is that this is somewhat structurally tied to the global macroeconomic imbalances and the subsequent discourse on Bretton Woods II as maintained, for example, by Brad Setser.

It is thus clear that in a world where the large emerging markets (save perhaps India), and the petro exporters, are pegging to the Dollar consquently amassing a fluctuating volume of US sovereign debt and of FX reserves in general these countries are not going to aggressively issue sovereign debt since this would of course entail a de-facto appreciation (re-valuation) of their currencies. Moreover it seems, there is little need at this juncture for big emerging markets to issue debt since they have no substantial deficits to cover. In terms of the imbalances themselves this, of course, means that they have to prop up the currency(ies) to which they are pegging by supporting the external deficit of the countries involved through purchase of debt or equity. This is of course also at the heart of the matter in terms of Bretton Woods II since capital flows are running counter to textbook theory from the point of view of the traditional relationship between developed and developing economies. In short, instead of running current account deficits which would entail issuance of sovereign debt, big emerging markets such as for example Brazil and China represent substantial global net demand, in particular for US sovereign debt but also essentially and more generally for sovereign debt or equity from all countries whose external deficit constitutes the counterpart to their external surpluses.

Another point here is the ageing process itself - which as we know is not only occuring in the developed world but also, and with some force, in many emerging market countries as the final stage of their demographic transition ripples through. In this way ageing will affect the supply of sovereign debt in the long run through two interconnected mechanisms. First of all, as Edward and I have argued before, an ageing economy, such as for example Germany, Japan and perhaps Italy, will have a tendency to revert to a growth path structurally prone to the generation of an external surplus. At least, this seems to be a sound assumption about the general picture before we finally get to a period of 'rapid' dissaving ,whatever this may look like.

Secondly, it seems as if these ageing economies are now embarking on fiscal belt-tightening instead of issuance of new debt, a transition which makes some sense since it is pretty difficult for e.g. Japan or Italy to continue issuing sovereign at debt at this juncture given the rapid ageing they now have on the horizon, and given the sovereign debt to GDP levels which in both cases now constitute over 100% of GDP. This also goes for other large economies in the Eurozone which are in theory bound by the EMU's demand for a maximum limit of debt to GDP at 60%. These countries most likely will not issue new debt in substantial quantities either since ageing and rising dependancy ratios are already pushing heavily on existing debt levels. In fact, it does seem as if the whole idea of sovereign debt rating by the likes of Standard and Poor and Moodys will need to be re-thought as a result of ageing. Take a look for example at the figure below from a paper at the Australian Reserve Bank which plots hypothetical future sovereign debt ratings primarily as a result of ageing. Whether or not this corresponds to a future reality is, of course, a different question, but take a look at Japan which is set to become 'non-investment grade' by 2020, that is a mere 13 years from now!

This suggests then that the future for sovereign debt is set to remain a story of shortage of assets relative to demand. This is, in part, due to ageing on the one side and Bretton Woods II on the other, since the former acts as a de-facto impediment for the already indebted countries to issue new portions of long term sovereign debt, and the latter operates through the lack of meaningful and tradable debt issuance by emerging markets and petro exporters who are pegging to the dollar. Add to this Stephen Jen's point about how growth in the last decade has been extraordinarily strong coupled with a strong growth in liquidity which has, of course, been further exacerbated by the lack of supply of sovereign debt on a global aggregate basis (increased leverage should perhaps also be noted here). My point is just that I do not necessarily think that a sudden turn in the impressive global growth spurt will prompt a resurgence in sovereign debt issuance, at least not from rapidly ageing economies which is of course part of the whole damn problem here since how will Japan and Italy ever be able to repay if the current surge in growth does not continue over a very prolonged period, which, at this point, seems rather unlikely I think. Having said that, a gradual shift in the Bretton Woods II regime could prompt countries such as, for example, Brazil to issue more long term debt, and China might also join in, but such a large change won't happen from one day to the next.

What about Equities then?

Bonds are of course not the only assets around, and equities are also currently offering yield to pension funds, sovereign wealth funds (SWFs), other institutional investors and retail investors. Yet, equities are also included in Stephen Jen's asset shortage hypothesis and the overall theme is the same as with bonds. A decade of impressive corporate profits and growth has reduced the demand for companies to issue shares for financing purposes. Yet, this I feel is not the entire story in terms of stocks and equities. Here we also need to look at the rise of private equity which has hit capital markets like a tornado in the recent years with their buy-out deals (often leveraged, i.e. LBOs). This frenzy has of course pushed prices higher but crucially, since buyout deals often also entail public delisting, this has had the effect of squeezing the supply of equities, at least from the point of view of retail investors, and of index/equity based mutual funds. It is not as if the assets go away just because they become part of a private equity portfolio, but I still think there is an important point here, since private equity for the most part is not available for retail investors. This brings us to the pension funds, and these, of course, and given the rise in saving which ageing involves, are finding it increasingly more difficult to manage their incoming wealth given the pressure to produce yield. This then means that pensions funds are increasingly more actively looking for stakes in private equity, or hedge funds for that matter, in order to produce an adequate return. At this juncture we also need to note the SWFs which increasingly are diversifying into equities, and straying ever farther afield from their traditional and plain reserve management through investing in sovereign debt. A great deal of fuss was made recently about the participation in the IPO of private equity group Blackstone from China via a US 3bn stake.

More generally, as also noted recently by the FT's Alphaville and Morgan Stanley's GEF, the size of SWFs is going to grow substantially as we move towards 2015. Stephen Jen's napkin calculations suggest a whopping amount of about US 12bn in assets. As such, even if equity investments perhaps will continue to be on the margin, such activity is sure to push equity valuations higher, and more generally in terms of sovereign debt the continuing accumulation of reserves are sure to keep those bond yields compressed too. Yet, it is really difficult to make an analytical call on the long term trend here whilst keeping a straight face. On that note, the recent market.view column at the Economist provides an interesting perspective, and one which was also picked up by Brad Setser.

Whether ageing will directly affect the supply of equities is not easy to gauge; most likely it will not do so in any direct sense. The most important driving forces for the de-facto supply of equities seem to be of institutional nature. For example, David Gaffen from the WSJ noted recently how legislation in the US has also decreased the stock of initial public offerings (IPOs). I would also note the continuing, and most likely lingering, trend of private equity buy-outs which is going to nudge up valuations as well as diminishing the supply of assets particularly for those who don't have the financial muscle to directly participate in private equity or hedge funds since these also represent assets beyond the reach of the average retail investor. On this point, I also feel the need to note the recent Buttonwood column which takes on precisely the question of who actually loses out to the emergence private equity and hedge funds; the answer; shareholders (pension funds, insurance funds and retail investors). When all this is said however there is still, presumably, plenty of capital deepening to come in the form of public listings and IPOs in big emerging markets which will act as a long term structural force pushing up the supply of global equities.

Household Behaviour - What Comes Next?

Arguably the most powerful force acting as a proxy for the ageingeffect on financial markets comes from the agers themselves, the households which, in connection with the bird's eye view of financial markets above, could be considered as potential retail investors. This latter point is important, since it is getting increasingly more difficult for the average retail investor to look through an opaque financial market where equities and bonds are spiced up with a myriad of structured and leveraged products. Add to this that retail investors are often exposing themselves to risks they have no idea off. I mean, does John Doe really know the investment strategy of the pension fund in which he is pooling his savings?

However, the real nut to crack in order to gauge the effect of ageing on financial markets relates to the nature and shape of the life cycle path for consumption and saving. It is of course futile to try to identify a global life cycle path but as more and more developed, and in some instances developing, countries enter a stage of rapid ageing and rising dependency ratios important questions are raised. In general, there are two overall narratives. The first one has been widely debated and relates to the concept of rapid dissaving. On this view the fact that ageing occurs more or less across the same time period in many developed countries should lead towards a global movement of rapid dissaving at some point as retired workers begin to spend their savings. It is argued that this will then lead to a steady erosion of the aggregate saving rates and, as a consequence, have a slowing effect on long term growth. Yet, we need to ask ourselves, is this story plausible and, even more crucially, if it happens, when will it happen?

This issue draws attention to an important point about this whole narrative in the sense that what is normally involved is a good deal of speculation about the state of the world in 2040, or 2050, and perhaps further even beyond. Now this entire perspective seems rather imprudent in my opinion mainly because it involves the prediction of things far out in the future which no-one really can claim to adequately make. Moreover it makes the assumption that things which happen between now and then will make no notable impact, and again, and in particular in this regard, the discourse often ignores the fact that even though all the developed countries are ageing, they are not all ageing at the same rate, and thus we need to take into account the possibility that these differences might exert some influence on the final outcome.

Here I think another, rather more interesting, approach would be to start by looking at what may happen during the transition path towards such a hypothetical end point of rapid dissaving, and in particular start from what we can actually see happening right now.

Looked at in this way, the principle of dissaving on an aggregate basis should not be too difficult to understand. As the ratio of retired households to working households rises in an economy there could be a tendency to dissaving on an aggregate basis. But will there be?

I don't have any definitive answers to all this yet, but it is clear that as working households build up expectations about enjoying a period of retirement in relative abundance, as well as taking into account rising life expectancy, we may begin to see that existing savings levels must be stretched and stretched by the increasing demands this will present and this in itself may put pressure on households to begin to save earlier. Moreover, as the governor of the Bank of Finland excellently note recently, theoretical models of dissaving tend to predict that retired households realize their assets far more quickly than is likely going to be the case in reality. Lastly, there will also exogenous pressures on working households to increase their savings in part in order to support a rising dependancy ratio but also because of the general perception that working households will need to ramp up savings to support future economic growth and thereby investment.

All this is of course not imprudent when viewed from a macroeconomic perspective, but as some of the authors here at GEM have pointed out on several occasions, in an ageing society, where working and supporting cohorts will be ever smaller, domestic demand will tend to be depressed over time. Moreover, capital flows will (at least before we get to point zero and rapid dissaving) tend to flow from ageing economies towards higher yielding regions. Examples of this could be Japan and Germany at the current juncture. This also means that in the medium to long term, as more and more countries join the league of countries (potentially!) running external surpluses, there will be even more capital chasing even less yield. And this is perhaps my main point here, in that before we get to a point where ageing will result in rapid dissaving and asset realization by retired households something else will happen. We could think about this something in terms of liquidity, since if an ever-rising median age in a country is a proxy for what is happening in Japanese - ie very low real interest rates in the domestic economy and an external surplus - then ageing economies could be viewed as net suppliers of liquidity to global markets.

In Summary

In this note I have reflected on the effect of ageing on financial markets. Ageing is not, of course, the only determinant of the evolution in financial markets but given the trajectory of the process in the developed world it is likely to have a significant impact. Many commentators have pointed to the transition towards a process of rapid dissavings where households and most notably retiring baby-boomers realize their assets at great pace. I have tried to nuance and qualify that claim.

Firstly, I talked about the supply of and demand for sovereign debt in the light of Stephen Jen's hypothesis of a shortage of assets. Apart from Jen's point that the recent years of extraordinary strong economic growth have deterred, or removed the need as it were, for economies to issue new bulks of sovereign debt (save most notably the US), ageing itself, I think, is already having a strong impact on the issuance of sovereign debt. This is particularly the case in countries where ageing has already entered the prolonged stage where the countries in question will find it very difficult to issue more debt. Also for example under the EMU framework there are very concrete institutional boundaries as to the issuance of debt beyond a long term threshold of 60% of GDP, which of course is a level that could be nudged upwards more or less at will (or perhaps as part of a battle of wills between the EU Commission and the ECB).

Secondly, I noted the situation of Bretton Woods II where some energy exporters and key emerging markets have piled up massive amounts of reserves, a situation which does not make it likely that we will see substantial issuance of sovereign debt from this angle either. Instead, these countries are pushing yields down - most notably on US treasuries - as a result of their dollar (or whatever) peg. On equity markets SWFs are bound to make their presence felt to an even greater extent. More specifically on equity markets it is difficult to see a direct impact on the supply of equities as a result of ageing. However, as with pension funds and ageing, retail investors hungry for yield are moving more aggressively into equities, and thus demand could potentially outstrip supply on a long term basis thus pushing up valuations, especially if the current wave of private equity deals continue along the same path. Another point here are the IPOs and also M&As in emerging markets where there seems plenty of room for increased capital deepening which could push the supply of assets up.

On balance I think that there are reasons to believe that ageing will affect financial markets in the following ways. First of all ageing will most likely increase the demand for assets, and more specifically for yield, and this in turn will mean that ageing also will be a source of global liquidity. Another point which is of note is how ageing might influence financial markets indirectly by prompting governments to intervene. As such, and even though it does not form part of my general analysis, the paper (noted above) by W Todd Groome, Nicolas Blancher, Parmeshwar Ramlogan and Oksana Khadarina from the Australian Reserve Bank offers the proposal that governments act alongside financial markets to insure and essentially hedge against longevity risks associated with ageing. More generally, and in the same tune, the paper speaks of 'financial innovation' as a way to deal with the obvious financial risk associated with ageing. Finally, and very much to the point I think, the financial literacy of households needs to increase, especially in a world where the challenges of ageing to an increasing degree will rest on the individual household.

*In this note I have left out detailed description of the increase in leverage and sophisticated structured products. This is clearly a caveat, but to the extent that these instruments are important (I think that they are) I believe a seperate note should be devoted to them.

Thursday, January 18, 2007

Devil May Care: Can Heterodox Policies Co-exist With or Become a Limited Part of Free Market Systems?

by Artim : New York

What do Thailand and Ecuador have in common? Though this may seem like an obtuse question, the answer clearly is a “Devil May Care” attitude to their, respective, structural policies. Clubbing Thailand in the same league as Ecuador may seem a bit harsh for any seasoned emerging market watcher; although, arguably, they do now share the dubious distinction of -either actively considering or- directly putting at risk policy keystones of their [post-crisis] economic recoveries to the detriment of foreign investors and conventional perceptions of sustainable policies. We think the unanticipated policy heterodoxy of the two referenced countries is important to watch and assess carefully as they could represent potential precedents for nasty --anti-foreign-- political, policy and legal surprises in several emerging markets down the road. Our fear is premised on the notion that further such event risks cannot be ruled out given country specific idiosyncrasies amidst: 1) global liquidity growth and risk seeking behavior that continues to outpace structural & institutional improvements(or lack thereof) in several countries; and, 2) An increasingly apparent failure of multilateral frameworks for ensuring free trade and optimal investment flows.

Turning briefly to individual country experiences…

In Ecuador’s case, considerable investor uncertainty has arisen after the new President, Mr. Rafael Correa, has persisted with his inclination to restructure (if not outright default on) Ecuadorean $-bonds. Moreover, there is also considerable uncertainty regarding President Correa’s plans for ‘de-dollarizing’ the Ecuadorean economy. Much has been written in the press and in EM analysts’ notes about the foolishness, and long-term costs, of a needless external debt default. I, however, focus here on the reasons for the “Devil May Care” attitude that underpins the Ecuadorian President’s push for de-dollarization.

First, and foremost, it must be remembered that adoption of the US$ as legal tender, in 2000, was the cornerstone of controlling inflation and restoring depositor faith in the banking system in the aftermath of the country’s financial crisis of 1999-2000. After dollarization, the Ecuadorean economy has grown at a respectable (average annual) clip of 4.7%, inflation declined from 91% in 2000 to 3% in 2006, and –in the same time period- the fiscal deficits have been restrained to within 1% of GDP. Decent growth, low inflation (& low real interest rates) and the absence of serious fiscal imbalances enabled a substantial reduction of Ecuador’s public debt burden, from a peak of 84% of GDP at the beginning of 2000 to an estimated 32% in 2006.

However, such notable fiscal and monetary improvements have not been accompanied by significant improvements in the underlying productive and employment generating capacities of the economy. The ratio of agriculture:services:industry sectors, in the overall economy, have largely remained unchanged roughly in the order of 6:34:60; though, with a slight sectoral tilt in favor of industry – due mostly to the development of the oil sector amidst globally high crude prices. However, the concentration of employment in low-value add sectors (yes, Ecuador remains a large producer of bananas, plantain, shrimp & fisheries.) amidst a capital-intensive oil-industry driven economic expansion has actually led to a creeping rise in recorded unemployment to nearly 11% of the labor force in 2006, up from under 9% in 2001. When such structural economic deficiencies are combined with Ecuador’s unique set of political tensions, and congressional schisms, it comes as no surprise that the broad swell of economic frustration has been cycnically channeled into anti-foreign creditor sentiment and resentment toward the country’s corrupt business class and querulous legislature by the likes of Mr. Correa. Setting aside domestic political considerations and shenanigans for the moment, the crux of President Correa’s economic argument is that Ecuador needs a wider range of public investment, since the private sector remains either too small or too inefficient or too corrupt to assist with the country’s pressing human and infrastructure development needs. However, substantially larger outlays of public monies without concomitant plans to increase the revenue base –within a dollarized regime- imply a populist fiscal stance that is inconsistent with price stability, external competitiveness and the country’s growth prospects.

Clearly, the only way to sidestep such constraints is to de-dollarize the monetary system. But even then, the new President appears unafraid or unconcerned about inflationary impacts from the (ostensible) monetization of a sharp escalation of fiscal imbalances. I think this lack of fear is based on two important global trends. First, is the preponderance of global liquidity backed by the Latin American financier of last resort – Hugo Chavez. The referenced benign global liquidity backdrop, bolstered by regional leftist-political and financial support clearly solidifies the expectation that any fiscal and monetary costs and risks can be stanched, in the short-term, by inflows from Chavez and eventually be passed on to foreign investors, in the long-term. After all, Chavez purchased Argentine global bonds –since Argentina was cut off from global primary debt markets- and then, subsequently, the Venezuelans went on to sell the Argentine debt to global investors in secondary markets at a handsome profit! De-dollarization could ultimately also set the stage for a harsh restructuring of Ecuadorean sovereign debt owed to foreign investors (I find it hard to foresee a unilateral restructuring or forced default while Ecuador’s monetary system remains dollarized; as all of its trade & capital account payments ultimately have to clear in the U.S. payments systems). The second factor underpinning the President’s bravado has to do with the gradual increase in Ecuador’s trade integration that has brought few economy wide benefits. Ecuador’s trade/GDP ratios have crept up from 56%, in 2001, to roughly 62% in 2006; not exactly a ringing indicator of trade integration, but it appears worse when most of the increase is accounted for by the exports and imports of the capital-intensive oil industry. In this regard, the President has –unsurprisingly- been dismissive of Washington’s offer of renewing its unilateral Free Trade Agreement (FTA). The Ecuadorean’s clearly expect a steady stream of hard currency from fairly inelastic global demand for its oil, with or without a spaghetti noodle network of bi-lateral trade deals that have been of little use to it in fostering more labor-intensive specialization in other higher value-add industries.

Turning to Thailand…

Investors are by and large used to the sort of political and policy volatility that is a direct consequence of institutional weaknesses and political bickering in such countries as Ecuador. But clearly, there was a much stronger consensus that Thai policy-makers have matured or were at least widely expected to act accountably. The forcible removal of Prime Minister Thaksin in a [peaceful] coup-de-tat was welcomed by the country’s political class and foreign investors as good riddance of divisive and corrupt influences. Moreover, the promises of constitutional reforms and early elections by the provisional administration, and the lack of any serious political disturbances offset any lingering fears of lack of legitimacy that in turn could lead to prolonged policy gridlocks. However, subsequently, the “Devil May Care” attitude of the Bank of Thailand in its efforts to stem the “excessive” inflow of foreign capital led it to impose strict controls on foreign investment inflows, on Dec. 19, 2006. Although, certain restrictions were eased within days of its imposition, as local equity markets tanked; most of the draconian controls remain in place, and were ratified --in the “Foreign Business Law”-- by the government, in mid-January ’07. While the BoT may profess that its hand was were forced by the dearth of policy options in the face of excessive inflows of speculative capital and too much appreciation of the Thai Baht, I remain unconvinced. In fact, not only does the unorthodox imposition of such capital controls mark a drastic departure from Thailand’s post [1997] currency crisis policy of maintaining a clearly defined and transparent free float of the Thai Baht with no capital controls but it: 1) is reminiscent of precisely the kind of policy arbitrariness that is often associated with the un-thoughtful acts of unelected or unaccountable public officials, and predicated on the belief that it does not really matter since ample global liquidity is still out there; and 2) also goes to show that multilateral frameworks for reducing regional currency pressures either do not work or are vastly underutilized.

Setting aside, for the moment, more deeper political considerations that have been channeled into anti-foreign sentiment [against the Singaporeans, and other foreign investors] and used as a rationale for the government’s anti-foreign investor policies; recent interviews by the BoT governor Ms. Tarisa Watanagase- have proved extremely revealing of the mindset of the country’s new policy makers. Mrs. Watanagase says -- “I’ve been criticized for taking the market by surprise by taking unconventional methods, especially capital controls…” She then goes on to say “…conventional wisdom works only when you are in a conventional environment.” The question that, then, arises is – are the FX appreciation pressures at other emerging markets any less exceptional? Does Brazil’s FX appreciation of 40-50% in the past year also not warrant an “unconventional” policy response? Or what about appreciation pressures on the KrW, S$, or even IDR, and so on? The financial press has reacted by alternating between condemning the investor uncertainty that the BoT’s actions have generated to being sympathetic about how Thailand had few other good policy options other than to change the rules of the FX game itself; although there has been near universal chastisement of the clumsy manner in which Thailand went about actually implementing its unorthodox controls. The broader points that are often missed here are that: First, Thailand could have done much more in terms of market based measures such as raising its cash reserve ratios and cutting interest rates more sharply to dissuade speculative money flows (as it appears to be doing in recent days); and, second, as a sitting member of the ASEAN, Thailand could have done more to galvanize ASEAN to take up a collaborative stance on currency policy coordination amongst its membership and/or take a common position vis-à-vis China’s RMB policy. Lack of action on the latter (policy coordination) may reflect disbelief that coordinated multilateral FX policies have any chance of success; or perhaps the interim Thai administration simply didn’t have the wherewithal to solidify its domestic legitimacy before taking on broader issues of regional, and global, concern. But what is clear is that an arbitrary policy stance that depends on elements of shock or surprise or is inherently punitive in nature tends to view the utilization of highly unorthodox methods as if it were among a range of acceptable policy options (while invoking “exceptional” circumstances). And as such, these heterodox policy measures are also predicated on the firm belief that global liquidity is here to stay and that there will be no long term adverse impacts. If such assumptions and predications did not exist, then, in my opinion, the draconian policy measures would not be implemented to begin with.

So the key question to take away from all this is -- can drastic regime changes become mere instruments of policy choice in countries that otherwise retain a nominal commitment to free trade and liberal economic systems? My answer would be, No! However, the instances of Thailand and the evolving situation in Ecuador seem to suggest otherwise. Thereby showing once again that conventional notions of what might be possible and acceptable --from a monetary policy standpoint-- may be undergoing considerable transformations, thanks in large part to the lack of adequate risk differentiation in a highly liquid world that acts as an opiate against the institutional and/or structural shortcomings of specific countries.