Friday, October 19, 2007

Employment and Unemployment in Poland

by Edward Hugh: Barcelona

This post is essentially a research note on the current state of the Polish labour market. It forms part of a series of posts being prepared by Global Economy Matters to accompany the up and coming Polish elections, which are due to be held this weekend. Alongside this post you can find a general review of the electoral situation by Manuel Alvarez, and I will be writing additional notes on the Polsih trade balance and on migration and remittances in the Polsih context, while Claus Vistesen will be taking a look at indebtedness, capital flows and the current account balance situation. All in all a rather full analysis, which given the key role which Poland may play in any Eastern European emerging markets disarray is probably only fitting.

Now, at the end of September the Polish Statistical Office published its unemployment report for the second quarter of 2007, and very interesting reading it is.


Before going into the details of the report, perhaps a bit of background information would be useful. First of all, economic growth. GDP has been growing at a pretty nifty clip in Poland in recent quarters, not as fast as in the Baltics, but pretty fast, as we can see in the chart below. Over the last twelve month the rate has been hovering in the 6% to 7% region.




Now the question is, is this growth sustainable? Stripped to its bare minimum, an economy needs three things for growth - labour, capital and raw materials - pretty much in the same way as a cement mixer needs sand, cement and water, all in the right proportions, of course. The analogy, in the present context, is not completely devoid of significance, since construction activity, and hence the production of cement, is an important part of the recent Polish story in its own right.

So as I say: is this sustainable? Well, capital is at present in pretty plentiful supply, although the danger does exist - since this capital is to a large extent not the product of domestic Polish savings - that this supply could dry up, and even be sucked backwards, as Claus will explain in his post. Raw material are available, but not always at the most favourable price, as we are currently seeing in relation to food and energy.

But what about labour? What is the position with the labour supply situation in Poland? Well this brings us directly to the tricky topic of Polish unemployment, which we will now proceed to explore.

Long Term Unemployment Decline

Historically unemployment in Poland has been pretty high. Most recently it peaked in 2003, and has now been dropping for a number of years, as can be seen from the annual unemployment chart below.




If we come to look at the monthly unemployment data for the last twelve months then we can see that this decrease in unemployment has been accelerating steadily in recent times.





The decrease in the numbers of unemployed is in part, of course, a reflection of an increase in employment, and the volume of employment in Poland has, as can be seen below, been increasing steadily since the end of the contraction which took place between 1999 and 2004.

Here is the annualy % change in the volume of employment:




And here are the numbers of employed on a quarterly basis since the begining of 2004:




The number of people registered with the Polish labour offices as unemployed at the end of June 2007 was 1,895,100 (of which 1,107,700 were women). This constituted a reduction of 337,400 on the number of unemployed in March (the end of Q1). Compared with June 2006 unemployment was down by 592,500 (or by 23.8%). Thus, viewed on a quarterly basis, the decline has been very dramatic, as can be seen below.




Perhaps also worthy of note is the fact that the decline in the numbers of unemployed has been more rapid among men - 322,800 (or 29.1% of the total unemployed) - than among women 269,800 (or 19.6%).

When compared to June 2006 unemployment decreased in all the Polsish voivods, and the declines have been quite dramatic. The most significant declines took place in in Dolnośląskie (30.2%), Wielkopolskie (29.8%), Pomorskie (27.5%), Opolskie and Śląskie (26.8%).

(Please click over image for better viewing)




The unemployment percentage rate at the end of June 2007 was 12.4% of the economically active civilian population, and was thus 2.0 points lower than in Q1 2007, and 3.5 % points lower than in June 2006.

There is still considerable territorial difference in the levels of unemployment in Poland. The highest unemployment rate is to be found in the voivods of Warmińsko-Mazurskie (19.6%), Zachodniopomorskie (17.9%), Kujawsko- Pomorskie (16.2%) and Lubuskie (by 15.8%), while the lowest unemployment rate exists in the voivods of Wielkopolskie (9.3%), Małopolskie (9.5%), and Mazowieckie (10.2%).

(Please click over image for better viewing)




Looking at the two maps taken together, it is very clear that the area where labour tightening is most dramatic at the present moment is Wielkopolskie, since the unemployment rate is already comparatively low, and the pace of reduction in the unemployment rate is also pretty rapid. Wielkopolska Province is second in area and third in population among the sixteen Polish voivods, with a land area of 29,826 km² and a population of 3.4 million. The province's principal cities are Poznań, Leszno, Kalisz and Gniezno. It also hosts part of the Kostrzyn-Slubice Special Economic Zone.


In general terms what we can see is that as the Polish economy has been expanding, it has been consuming labour, and rapidly so. One interesting calculation here is to make an estimate of how much labour is needed to produce 1% of GDP growth with the current proportions of sand, cement and water which are being shoveled into the economic mixer (ie at today's rate of productivity increase). A rough and ready, rule of thumb type, calculation would tell us that to get 6% annual growth the unemployment roll is coming down by about 600,000 peopple per annum, that is that each annual percentage point of economic growth reduces the numbers of available unemployed by 100,000. (This is a rough and ready calculation, but it is a more sophistocated one than first meets the eye, since it does, in approximate way, implicitly incorporate the ageing and withdrawal from the labour force dimension).

What this means quite simply is that, given the relatively low size of the younger cohorts about to enter the labour force, a 6% growth rate just is not sustainable for that much longer. If we imagine that unemployment could only with great difficulty fall below 500,000 without producing spiralling hyper-inflation, then we have an outer limit of 2 years at the present growth rate I think.

After that, what is the sustainable - capacity - growth rate? This is very hard to say without a much fuller econometric analysis, since it depends among other things on the direction and intensity of both migratory and capital flows. Many people, and especially those with a relatively poor understanding of how economic processses actually operate, tend to raise the objection at this point that such a calculation may not be accounting for productivity growth. This would be a mistake, and an elementary one, since the present rate of unemployment attrition already incorporates a certain level of productivity improvement.

So what such an argument normally wants to claim is that some sort of rapid improvment in the rate of productivity growth is on the horizon - rather like Alan Greenspan argued in the late 90s based on the arrival of the internet. A continuing increase in Polish productivity is, of course, to be expected, but it is not clear why people are expecting a dramatic acceleration in the rate of productivity growth. If this expectation is to become more than a simple vain hope it does need some sort of analytical justification. In the meantime we might do well to bear in mind that such improvements are a by product of stocks and flow movements in human capital formation, which is why the age structure of the existing population, and their education level, is such an important topic.

So, if we said that between 2010 - 2012 Polish capacity economic growth might be something in the region of 2 to 3%, then we probably would not be that far from the mark. Post 2012 it is much harder to estimate things, especially since, among other issues, the ageing population component will begin to have an ever greater impact.


Labour Quality


One of the main issues on which we are focusing in this analysis is the rate of reduction of the unemployment level in Poland and the evolution of the future labour supply. It is important to be aware that this future evolution is in great part conditioned by two factors:

1) The very low numbers of live births (in historical terms) which there have been in Poland since the late 1980's and;

2) The relatively high levels of out migration which Poland has expecienced in the last three or four years, which mean certain key groups of workers in the main productive age ranges will not be available to Poland to fuel growth as we move forward.



I have a much fuller (examination of the Polish fertility vackground in this post , but the following graph should make the underlying position pretty clear:



Basically live births dropped from a level of around 700,000 per year in the mid 1980's to around 400,000 per annum in the mid 1990s. That is a net loss of 300,000 potential labour market entrants per year (or a reduction of around 40% in the labour flow, I can hear that cement mixer starting to crunch as I write), a loss which will increasingly make its presence felt between now and 2015.

With these points in mind it is interesting to note that in Q2 2007 the number of people who left the unemployment rolls was 873,000. The largest group who went off the unemployment rolls in Q2 2007 did so as a result of finding a job. In fact 364,000 people left the rolls to take up work in Q2 2007 (or 41.7% of the total leaving) as compared with 425,300 (or 46.8%) in Q2 2006.


It is also interesting to note that during Q2 2007 264,900 people who were previously registered as unemployed did not confirm their readiness to take a job. This seems to suggest that the Polish authorities are busily cleaning up their unemployment registers - the reduction for "non-availability" constituted some 30.3% of the total reduction in the number of people on the unemployment rolls during the quarter (in Q2 2006 the figures were respectively 259,500 and 28.6%) - and many of the people removed were more than likely already working, whether the work in question was inside or outside of Poland.

So one part of the apparent Polish "reserve army" may in reality simply not exist. Another part may - speaking in plain English terms - be far from serviceable for modern economic growth purposes.

In this context it is interesting to note that the long-term unemployed constituted 65.7% of the Q2 2007 total (1,245,000), and many of these people may turn out to be very hard to "recycle" into the modern world. In terms of the relative age structure of the remaining unemployed, under 25 year olds constituted 18.9% of the total (358,600), while persons aged over 50 were 21.0% (398,1oo thous).

At the end of Q2 2007, 1,639,300 people on the rolls did not possess the right to unemployment benefit, and this group represented 86.5% of the total number of registered unemployed, (in the previous quarter it was respectively 1,930,700 and 86.5%). Among this group 43.4% were people living in rural areas.

There were also more female than male unemployed. At the end of Q2 2007 58.5% of the total unemployed were female, and this was up by 3.1 % points on Q2 2006. The highest percentage share of women in the total number of the unemployed is to be found in the Wielkopolskie (65.6%), Pomorskie (64.0%), Kujawsko-pomorskie (62.3%) and Małopolskie (61.5%)vovoids.

One of the key difficulties in evaluating the remaining unemployed labour force in Poland is getting a precise reading on the quality of the labour which remains available. It is hard to get a clear picture here, but one indication which is not without importance can be found in the fact that the majority of the unemployed registered in the labour offices were persons with relatively low levels of education. The share of registered unemployed who did not have any occupational qualification whatsoever was 30.7% of the total registered unemployed (582,000).

In addition the two largest groups among the unemployed were persons having only basic vocational orlower secondary education (30.1% of the total), or persons with only primary or even incomplete-primary education (32.5% of the total number of the unemployed registered at the end of June 2007). Combined these groups constitute 62.6% of the total number of the unemployed.

On the other hand some 22.3% of the total had the certificate of completion of post-secondary and vocational secondary schools, while 9% had completed secondary education and 6.1% were graduates from tertiary schools.

So, in conclusion, and to reiterate. Poland is facing a potentially very acute and imminent trade off between economic growth and inflationary cost push. Some indication of this can already be found in the producer price index, which has been coming under increasing pressure since early 2006:



The earlier interest rate tightening from the central bank seems to have had some sort of short term impact during the March to July period, but, as we can see, the thing now seems to be taking off again. This position is only even more strongly confirmed if we look at the construction producer cost index.



It is also very clear that the steady tightening of labour market conditions is having an impact of Polish wages and salaries.



The annual rates of increase have been steadily picking up speed, and while they are still below those to be found elswhere in Eastern Europe (like the Baltics, Romania, Ukraine) the early warning signs of the "Baltic Syndrome" are there, which is hardly surprising since the underlying causes are essentially the same.

Information for this report comes, by and large from the Polish Statistical Office and Eurostat. In particular the recently publishedunemployment report for the second quarter of 2007 was evry useful, while additional information was taken from the Q2 2007 Labour Report (archive).

1 comments:

Anonymous said...

In 2009 GDP will be on the level of max. 1,5 %

Special Feature, The German Economy At A Glance

Welcome to the Global Economy Matters Blog. Below you will find the normal chronological blog posts. But first here is our Monthly Special Feature which in January 2008 focuses on Germany. Here you will find charts which provide background data on the German economy. We hope these will be of some help to the first time reader here, making it easier to contextualise, assess and get to grips with the general argument being presented on the blog. The big question which arose concerning the Germany economy in 2007 was whether or not the new found dynamism in German economic activity constituted some form of remaissance, and formed part of a global decoupling process whereby a sustainable recovery in domestic demand was taking place. Analysts on this blog never really accepted this view. The key question and central enigma associated with the German economy is really why domestic demand should have remained so congenitally weak over such a considerable period of time.

Since this phenomenon is also to be observed in the the two other societes with very high (circa 43) population median ages - Italy and Japan - we postulate that demographics and population ageing processes offer some part of the explanation here.

Basically what we can observe as societies move above the 40 median age mark are a number of stylised facts. Weakness in domestic private consumption would be one of these, absence of consumer credit driven property booms would be another, growing pressure on the national debt as the elderly dependence ratio steadily rises would be another, and growing dependence on export growth for sustaining GDP growth would be the central feature of the whole edifice.

We hope you will find the background data presented here useful in assessing the argument which we are presenting on this blog, which is basically that a key component in the longer term growth stagnation from which Germany is suffering has its roots in the underlying demographics. Basically and in the long run (possibly with a 30 year lag) fertility does matter. Please click on thumbnails for better viewing.




What follows is a very rough and ready attempt to describe in broad brush strokes how the contemporary German economy actually works. First off, and as is well known, German society is ageing, and at the same time the German population has started declining. Not only is Germany's median age rising, the proportion of the population in the key 25-49 age group is now falling.






As can be seen from the chart this crucial age group touched its highpoint in 1997/98. This could be thought of as the moment of maximum capacity for the German economy since it includes the crucial 25 to 40 household-former, first-time-homebuyer group. In terms of credit expansion, it is this group which drives a significant part of internal demand.




The age group also includes another important group, the 35 to 50 years one. This group drives an economy in productive terms, since these are the prime age workers. If you think of a society as a 100 metres sprint athlete, then there is an age when this athlete is at the maximum of his or her running potential, an age after which each time they can only run the 100 metres more slowly.





Well a society is the same in terms of its collective economic potential, without addressing underlying issues either through fertility or immigration, it can only move forward more and more slowly. Consumption becomes flat, and GDP growth - gioven the external dependence - fragile.





Private consumption has hovered pretty close to the 60% mark for many years now, while government consumption - after moving sharply upwards as a total share in the first half of the 1970s has subsequently remained pretty constant, moving around the 19% of GDP mark. The big difference has been in the importance of fixed capital formation (GFCF) which reached from 1975 to 2000hovered around the 22 - 24% of GDP mark.





Prior to 1975 GFCF was at a much higher level, while post 2000 it has dropped substantially And So what we can see is that the year between, say, 1975 and 2000, when GFCF remaind a more or less constant share of GDP, constituted - to use the language of neo-classical economics - the constant growth period of the German domestic economy.The years prior to 1975 were the convergence, or "catch-up" years



And especially the 1960s, after Germany finally broke out of the destruction and devastation of WWII - while the years after 2000 constitute what the neo-classicists would call the "balanced growth period", although as we can see, it isn't very balanced, and there certainly isn't a steady state.







2008 Forecasts: There is a consenus at the present time that the German economy is slowing. Where there is no real consensus is over the rate at which it is slowing and where and when it will settle. It is clear that GDP growth in 2007 will be below the heady 3.1% annual rate achieved in 2006. The OECD last December revised their 2007 German forecast down to 2.6%, and their 2008 one down to 1.8%. The IMF in their October World Economic Outlook forecast growth for 2007 at 2.4%, slowing to 2% in 2008. Morgan Stanley's Elga Bartsch, while optimistic that the German economy will whether the credit crunch better than most (and here she may well be right) is somewhat more sanguine, putting 2008 growth at 1.5%. In general though I rather doubt her overview that "Germany could well be on the way to becoming the new growth locomotive in Europe." and especially her suggestion that "the phase of underperformance in terms of GDP growth, which has plagued Europe’s largest economy for years, is clearly over." Unfortunately, what we are arguing on this blog is that Germany's GDP growth rates since the mid 1990s are not some special kind of "underperformance", but what can be expected from a society with a rapidly rising median age which is increasingly dependent on exports rather than domestic consumption for growth.



The EU commission in it's November 2007 forecast was also convinced that the German economy was now on a "solid growth path", forecasting 2.5% growth for 2007 and 2.1% for 2008.

I personally will be very surprised if we see growth in the region of 2% for the German economy in 2008, and I even consider the 1.8% from the OECD and 1.5% from Morgan Stanley still on the high side given the extent of downside risk. Basically the reasonably favourable depreciation rules which currently apply to German investment have been changed as of 1 January 2008, and we might reasonably expect to see some sort of impact on investment comparable with the negative shock which hit private domestic consumption following the VAT rise on 1 Jan 2007. In addition all the indications suggest that German consumption will continue to be weak in 2008. So if consumer consumption is at best flat, governemnt consumption equally so, and investment and construction weakening, we are simply lefy with export growth, and here the outlook is definitely more negative in 2008 than it was in 2007. The Spanish economy (one important German customer) is visibly wilting by the day, as is the UK (another big customer), but it is to Eastern Europe we must look for the biggest impact on German exports of any correction in 2008. Just one data point should suffice, Germany exports roughly the same value of goods to the Czech Republic (and more to Poland) as it does to China. This means that Geramny is proportionately not that exposed to any slowdown in China, but hugely exposed to any sudden shift in growth and demand in the East of Europe.

So I would say, that on current data, 1% growth in Germany in 2008 look a reasonable estimate at this point, but that this needs to be taken to mean with considerable downside risk. Germany is now tremendously dependent on what happens elsewhere, and until what does actually happen elsewhere becomes clearer it is difficult to be more precise on Germany.

The only apparent bright spot on the horizon is employment, but I am dubious that in the context of Germany's ageing workforce this will work through as some are hoping, as I expain at some considerable length in this post here. My opinion is that Germany will enter recession at some point during 2008, and that we may well have 2 consecutive quarters of negative growth. The continuing high euro will maintain pressure on German exports, and high oil and food prices will maintain pressure on the inflation front, at least in the first half of 2008. The ECB will probably switch stance towards rate reductions at some point, but since, as Elga Bartsch among many others so eloquently argues German internal consumption and investment are not especially dependent on credit conditions, easing from the ECB may not have as much impact as one would hope for.



Key Posts For Understanding The Present Path of the German Economy

Is The German Economy Heading For Recession in 2008?


Employment and Unemployment in Germany January 2008

Germany Economy, What Price the VAT Effect Now!

The German Economy, Employment, Export Shares and Age Structure

Structural Aspects of German Export Dependence

Does NeoClassical Steady State Growth Really Exist?