Saturday, August 9, 2008

Brazil Country Outlook August 2008

Claus Vistesen: Copenhagen

Brazil is a resource rich country in transition towards a much more diiversified economy where industry and high value services will begin to play an increasing role. Brazil has ample supplies of energy and agricultural products, and is currently hitting that “sweet spot” where a demographically driven growth dividend becomes available. Thus we can increasingly expect to see above trend “catch up” growth as the Brazillian economy benefits from the new wealth which accrues from the rapid global rise in commodity prices while the strong supply of young labour underpins the labour market and significant productivity improvements become available as the economy generally moves towards ever higher-value-added sectors of activity.

Perhaps the most telling sign of Brazil's rising status as a new global force to be reckoned with was the recent announcement by the National Petroleum Agency (ANP) of the discovery of a new offshore oil field (Carioca) which potentially holds as much as 33 billion barrels of oil - enough to supply every refinery in the U.S. for six years - making it the third-largest oil field ever discovered (only Saudi Arabia's Ghawar and Kuwait's Burgan fields are bigger). This, coupled with the discovery last year of the Tupi field - which has an estimated reservoir of between 5 and 8 billion barrels of oil – is now fast forwarding Brazil rapidly up through the ranks of global oil producing nations. Such new found oil prowess has even prompted president Lula da Silva to suggest that Brazil enter OPEC.

But Brazil is not only rich in energy; agriculture – that new high-value sector – is also an important contributor to Brazil’s rapidly growing GDP. Agricultural income should total 155.27 billion reais (US$ 71.4 billion) in Brazil in 2008, according to the Ministry of Agriculture. The estimate is based on crop surveys by the National Food Supply Company (Conab) and the Brazilian Institute for Geography and Statistics (IBGE).

And with global agricultural prices continually hitting record highs Brazil’s agricultural exports were up 15.22% in June over June 2007, and by 5.6% over May. The government estimate for this year’s total output includes 20 crops, some of them temporary ones such as soybean, maize, rice, wheat, sugarcane, and others permanent like coffee, cocoa, and oranges. Compared with 2007, the figure represents growth of 17.11% after inflation. The largest increases were expected to be in beans (87.78%), coffee (48.69%), wheat (40.79%), soybean (31.83%) and maize (30.65%). Brazil is now even producing grapes, and output is growing rapidly in the northeastern states of Pernambuco and Bahia.


Also Brazil's economy created a record 309,442 government-registered jobs in June as higher domestic demand coupled with revenue flows from rising commodity prices lead companies to add staff and increase output. Of these new jobs Brazil's agricultural sector accounted for the lions share, with 92,580 new jobs being created in June, the highest monthly figure recorded since the start of the current time series in 2003.

Recent Economic Indicators


The Brazilian economy continued to expand strongly in the first quarter of 2008, and turned in a respectable 5.84% increase in GDP when compared with the same period a year earlier. Looking at quarter on quarter growth on a seasonally adjusted basis (quarterly growth gives a much clearer “as things are now” snapshot of the current state of an economy at any point in time), the 0.71% reading reflected a moderate slowdown in the economy over the previous quarter. Consumption and investment both contributed to the quarterly growth rate, but it was government consumption which did the heavy lifting in Q1. The negative trade balance also acted as a drag on growth as exports declined while imports rose. Since Brazil is strong on commodity exports, and commodity prices have been very high in recent months, the underlying momentum is positive, although were inflation not to be kept in check some variant of the “dutch disease” could undoubtedly become a problem. At the present time however this danger should not be exaggerated, since underlying investment in capital goods is reasonably healthy, rising at rate of about 19% (12 month average) as compared to a rise of around 6.5% for industrial output generally.
The main driver of economic activity continues to be domestic demand. Private consumption rose in Q1 by 6.% (y-o-y) while investment held up well - rising by 15.2%. Nevertheless, the externally oriented sector has continued to weaken, largely because of the pressure on exports caused by the high Real, and exports were down 2.1% year-on-year. Imports, however, rose steeply - by 18.9%. The other aspect of growth was public consumption, which was up by 5.8%, which was the fastest rate since the middle of 2002.








One notable recent development has been the decision by ratings agency Standard & Poor’s to award Brazil investment grade, with the foreign currency debt rating being raised to BBB- from BB+. This decision has produced considerable debate as many long term Brazil watchers believe that the upgrade comes at a time when Brazil has all the cyclical winds blowing in her favour, and ask the not unreasonable question what happens when the weather shifts? It is clear however that Brazil has made tremendous improvements over the past decade in terms of central bank independence, reigning in inflation and setting public debt on a sound footing, so whatever the fine print details, Standard and Poor’s decision can surely not be considered an imprudent one.



As regards its external balance Brazil is rather different from many other large emerging economies since while the central bank (which has a high level of independence from government) does intervene in the spot market to try to keep a lid on the Real’s rise and to built up a “war chest” of international reserves the bank has allowed the currency to rise substantially against the US dollar (as of July the Real had appreciated by some 13% against the dollar in 2008) and Brazil has also recently opened a small but quite manageable deficit on its current account, which means that Brazil as it develops is becoming a net consumer of excess capacity in the global economy. A break-down of the current account position reveals that Brazil continues to retain a surplus on the goods balance due to the importance of commodities and food but that services and in particular a negative income account are now gradually pulling the overall balance into negative territory. This is really what one could reasonably expect in the context of an emerging economy at Brazil's stage of development.



On the monetary policy front the central bank is rapidly earning a reputation for itself as Latin America’s new Bundesbank, and governor Henrique Meirelles delivered a decisively hawkish message during the last monetary council meeting to accompany the decision to hoist rates by 75 basis points to the current 13% level. Brazil's interest rate is now the the second-highest inflation-adjusted one in the world after Turkey's. Brazil's real interest rate, or the benchmark 13 percent rate minus annual inflation of 6.06 percent, is 6.94 percent. Turkey currently has the world's highest so-called real interest rate at 7.55 percent.

This decision is the continuation of a hiking campaign set in motion in order to establish strong credentials for the central bank as an inflation fighter, and to prevent generalised inflation expectations from taking a hold among the population. The central bank is attempting to keep inflation within the the official target of 4.5% and with inflation forecast to be somewhat above that figure in 2009 the central bank is simply acting accordingly.



Such aggressive tightening is, however, not without its problems, and policy makers now face a serious dilemma. Predictably, given the state of the current global environment, the central bank's larger than expected interest hike was rapidly translated into an appreciation of the Real – pushing it to its strongest level since 1999. So far, the 13% rise against the USD this year puts the real in the pole position amongst emerging market currencies versus the USD. This position is reasonably comprehensible taking into account the recent decision to award Brazil investment grade status; this coupled with a nominal yield on 10 year government notes at about 15% and a benchmark stock index – the Bovespa – which is up approximately 10% from its January level, implying a 20% gain in US dollar term, basically mean that international investors are finding it hard not to put money into Brazil at this point in time.


Consequently, with a global credit crisis far from over, a hawkish central bank, and a hard currency making exports more difficult one could only reasonably expect the economy to slow in line with weaking global momentum. The key point with respect to the Real would be that a continuing rise will push the external balance further into negative territory. Moreover, in a likely scenario where global commodity prices somewhat pare-back their recent impressive upward movement Brazil’s external bookkeeping will further come under pressure.

Outlook on Key indicators


  • Following the most recent rate hike market expectations have now solidified towards further interest rate increases in the pipeline. The driving orce here will, as ever, be inflation running above the central bank's nominal target. Here at Emerginvest we see the Central Bank of Brazil aiming for a nominal rate of 15% which should be reached over the course of the next three meetings.

  • The Real is likely to continue to be supported by a hawkish central bank but as the external balance moves steadily into negative territory macro-fundamentals may take over, and as the economy slows and inflation comes into the target zone the central bank will once more move into loosening mode pushing the Real down in the process. A violent correction however is not expected.

  • GDP growth is expected to moderate in 2008 compared to the levels seen in 2007 but at this point growth projections remain solid, and we certainly see Brazil’s mid term sustainable growth rate as being above the consensus 3%-5% rate once inflation is firmly under control.


2007 Data

GDP (2007) - 5.4%
Inflation (2007) - 3.6%
Current Account Deficit -0.27% of GDP
Fiscal Deficit - 2.27% GDP
Debt to GDP ratio - 42.8%


Debt Ratings (local currency, long term)

Fitch - BBB-
S&P - BBB+
Moody- Ba1


2008 Central Bank Inflation Target - 4.5% (+ or – 2pp)

Population Median Age -29 years
Total Fertility Rate (2007) -1.88 child per women
Male Life Expectancy - 68.57 years

Development Indicators Rank (131 economies in total)

Global Competitiveness (World Economic Forum)
72/131 (2007-08)
Business Competitiveness (World Economic Forum)
59/131 (2007-08)


Selected Sub-components

Institutions - 104/131
Infrastructure - 78/131
Macroeconomic Stability - 126/131
Health and Primary Education -84/131

Short Term Data

Retail Sales Growth (May, y-o-y, volume index) - 10.5%
Industrial Output (May, y-o-y) - 2.4%
Inflation (July 2008) - 6.3%
Central Bank Interest Rate (SELIC Rate) - 13.0%

Posted by Edward Hugh at 2:23 PM

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Special Feature, The German Economy At A Glance

Welcome to the Global Economy Matters Blog. Below you will find the normal chronological blog posts. But first here is our Monthly Special Feature which in January 2008 focuses on Germany. Here you will find charts which provide background data on the German economy. We hope these will be of some help to the first time reader here, making it easier to contextualise, assess and get to grips with the general argument being presented on the blog. The big question which arose concerning the Germany economy in 2007 was whether or not the new found dynamism in German economic activity constituted some form of remaissance, and formed part of a global decoupling process whereby a sustainable recovery in domestic demand was taking place. Analysts on this blog never really accepted this view. The key question and central enigma associated with the German economy is really why domestic demand should have remained so congenitally weak over such a considerable period of time.

Since this phenomenon is also to be observed in the the two other societes with very high (circa 43) population median ages - Italy and Japan - we postulate that demographics and population ageing processes offer some part of the explanation here.

Basically what we can observe as societies move above the 40 median age mark are a number of stylised facts. Weakness in domestic private consumption would be one of these, absence of consumer credit driven property booms would be another, growing pressure on the national debt as the elderly dependence ratio steadily rises would be another, and growing dependence on export growth for sustaining GDP growth would be the central feature of the whole edifice.

We hope you will find the background data presented here useful in assessing the argument which we are presenting on this blog, which is basically that a key component in the longer term growth stagnation from which Germany is suffering has its roots in the underlying demographics. Basically and in the long run (possibly with a 30 year lag) fertility does matter. Please click on thumbnails for better viewing.




What follows is a very rough and ready attempt to describe in broad brush strokes how the contemporary German economy actually works. First off, and as is well known, German society is ageing, and at the same time the German population has started declining. Not only is Germany's median age rising, the proportion of the population in the key 25-49 age group is now falling.






As can be seen from the chart this crucial age group touched its highpoint in 1997/98. This could be thought of as the moment of maximum capacity for the German economy since it includes the crucial 25 to 40 household-former, first-time-homebuyer group. In terms of credit expansion, it is this group which drives a significant part of internal demand.




The age group also includes another important group, the 35 to 50 years one. This group drives an economy in productive terms, since these are the prime age workers. If you think of a society as a 100 metres sprint athlete, then there is an age when this athlete is at the maximum of his or her running potential, an age after which each time they can only run the 100 metres more slowly.





Well a society is the same in terms of its collective economic potential, without addressing underlying issues either through fertility or immigration, it can only move forward more and more slowly. Consumption becomes flat, and GDP growth - gioven the external dependence - fragile.





Private consumption has hovered pretty close to the 60% mark for many years now, while government consumption - after moving sharply upwards as a total share in the first half of the 1970s has subsequently remained pretty constant, moving around the 19% of GDP mark. The big difference has been in the importance of fixed capital formation (GFCF) which reached from 1975 to 2000hovered around the 22 - 24% of GDP mark.





Prior to 1975 GFCF was at a much higher level, while post 2000 it has dropped substantially And So what we can see is that the year between, say, 1975 and 2000, when GFCF remaind a more or less constant share of GDP, constituted - to use the language of neo-classical economics - the constant growth period of the German domestic economy.The years prior to 1975 were the convergence, or "catch-up" years



And especially the 1960s, after Germany finally broke out of the destruction and devastation of WWII - while the years after 2000 constitute what the neo-classicists would call the "balanced growth period", although as we can see, it isn't very balanced, and there certainly isn't a steady state.







2008 Forecasts: There is a consenus at the present time that the German economy is slowing. Where there is no real consensus is over the rate at which it is slowing and where and when it will settle. It is clear that GDP growth in 2007 will be below the heady 3.1% annual rate achieved in 2006. The OECD last December revised their 2007 German forecast down to 2.6%, and their 2008 one down to 1.8%. The IMF in their October World Economic Outlook forecast growth for 2007 at 2.4%, slowing to 2% in 2008. Morgan Stanley's Elga Bartsch, while optimistic that the German economy will whether the credit crunch better than most (and here she may well be right) is somewhat more sanguine, putting 2008 growth at 1.5%. In general though I rather doubt her overview that "Germany could well be on the way to becoming the new growth locomotive in Europe." and especially her suggestion that "the phase of underperformance in terms of GDP growth, which has plagued Europe’s largest economy for years, is clearly over." Unfortunately, what we are arguing on this blog is that Germany's GDP growth rates since the mid 1990s are not some special kind of "underperformance", but what can be expected from a society with a rapidly rising median age which is increasingly dependent on exports rather than domestic consumption for growth.



The EU commission in it's November 2007 forecast was also convinced that the German economy was now on a "solid growth path", forecasting 2.5% growth for 2007 and 2.1% for 2008.

I personally will be very surprised if we see growth in the region of 2% for the German economy in 2008, and I even consider the 1.8% from the OECD and 1.5% from Morgan Stanley still on the high side given the extent of downside risk. Basically the reasonably favourable depreciation rules which currently apply to German investment have been changed as of 1 January 2008, and we might reasonably expect to see some sort of impact on investment comparable with the negative shock which hit private domestic consumption following the VAT rise on 1 Jan 2007. In addition all the indications suggest that German consumption will continue to be weak in 2008. So if consumer consumption is at best flat, governemnt consumption equally so, and investment and construction weakening, we are simply lefy with export growth, and here the outlook is definitely more negative in 2008 than it was in 2007. The Spanish economy (one important German customer) is visibly wilting by the day, as is the UK (another big customer), but it is to Eastern Europe we must look for the biggest impact on German exports of any correction in 2008. Just one data point should suffice, Germany exports roughly the same value of goods to the Czech Republic (and more to Poland) as it does to China. This means that Geramny is proportionately not that exposed to any slowdown in China, but hugely exposed to any sudden shift in growth and demand in the East of Europe.

So I would say, that on current data, 1% growth in Germany in 2008 look a reasonable estimate at this point, but that this needs to be taken to mean with considerable downside risk. Germany is now tremendously dependent on what happens elsewhere, and until what does actually happen elsewhere becomes clearer it is difficult to be more precise on Germany.

The only apparent bright spot on the horizon is employment, but I am dubious that in the context of Germany's ageing workforce this will work through as some are hoping, as I expain at some considerable length in this post here. My opinion is that Germany will enter recession at some point during 2008, and that we may well have 2 consecutive quarters of negative growth. The continuing high euro will maintain pressure on German exports, and high oil and food prices will maintain pressure on the inflation front, at least in the first half of 2008. The ECB will probably switch stance towards rate reductions at some point, but since, as Elga Bartsch among many others so eloquently argues German internal consumption and investment are not especially dependent on credit conditions, easing from the ECB may not have as much impact as one would hope for.



Key Posts For Understanding The Present Path of the German Economy

Is The German Economy Heading For Recession in 2008?


Employment and Unemployment in Germany January 2008

Germany Economy, What Price the VAT Effect Now!

The German Economy, Employment, Export Shares and Age Structure

Structural Aspects of German Export Dependence

Does NeoClassical Steady State Growth Really Exist?