Sunday, January 14, 2007

Structural Drivers of Global Macroeconomic Imbalances

by Claus Vistesen : Copenhagen


Here at Global Economy Matters we we are going to emphasize that any analysis at the individual country-economy level needs to incorporate and take into account the global economic context. In this post I will try to outline one important conceptualization of the global economy as it is being widely debated at the moment amongst global economic analysts. I am speaking here of the phenomenon known as global macroeconomic imbalances and in terms of a brief description the visualization offered below from a recent IMF paper on the subject is good starting point.

global.imbalances.jpg *

Essentially, the concept of global macroeconomic balances is a proxy for the imbalance in the external balances in-and-between the world's major regions. More specifically, as can be seen from the figure the concept basically juxtaposes the US as an economy running a large current account deficit with other parts of the world running external surpluses or very small deficits. Apart from the actual description of this the most interesting task is to look at the economic dynamics and structural drivers behind these imbalances and it is here, as they say, that the plot thickens.

What are the dynamics and structural drivers of global imbalances?

1. Bretton Woods II

Perhaps the most widely cited explanation for the global imbalances at the moment is the notion of Bretton Woods II. This discourse which is excellently developed by Brad Setser from RGE directs its focus towards the US current account deficit on the one side and the dual dollar peg of Asia (most notably China) and Petro exporters on the other side. The empirical foundation for this analysis is very strong. Consequently, the US current account deficit seems indeed, at least to some degree, to be extensively mirrored in a very large and growing Chinese surplus as well as a joint surpluses being run by the petro exporters. This also brings us to the actual mechanism driving the global imbalances. As such, the main drivers become the surplus nations' fixed exchange rate policy, and the subsequent sterilization of the capital inflows associated with the huge external surpluses. More specifically, this mechanism works through the accumulation of reserves in dollars to keep a de-facto dollar peg by China's and the petro exporter's central banks. Finally, this also brings us to one of the major components in any re-balancing process where a gradual loosening of, for example, the RMB's value against the dollar would help smooth out the imbalances as the bilateral trade relationship of the two biggest economies in the world would correct to the fundamentals in a floating currency regime or as Brad Setser likes to point out: 'relative prices matter.'

2. A Savings Glut

It is of course difficult to seperate the explanations and discourses entirely here. However, where the proponents of Bretton Woods II discourse focus their attention somewhat narrowly on the triangle relationship between the US on one side and China and the Petroexporters on the other, the saving glut thesis attempts to look at global saving dynamics as a driver of global imbalances. The main point of this thesis is an attempt to reconcile the situation of low global real interest rates with the US's ability to continue borrowing ever larger amounts of capital from non-US sources (i.e. the ability to sustain a growing external deficit). Consequently, a growing US current account deficit then becomes a counter-result to the abundance of foreign thrift and as such the main research question becomes the scrutiny of the reasons for the glut in savings and whether this will persist in the future. This clearly also allows for the incorporation of a Bretton Woods II type scenario but crucially it also sets the scene for a broader analysis and conceptualization of the global economy. Another important aspect here involves examining the role of Europe and Japan and asking whether (and to what extent) these two global entities can contribute to global rebalancing, and if so what form (how far and how fast) this will take?

3. Demographics

The idea that demographics should have something to say in terms of explaning and conceptualizing global imbalances follows directly and intuitively from the saving glut thesis referred to above. As such, one of the fundamental pillars in the saving glut thesis is indeed how demographics on a global scale represent a driver of thrift. In fact, a 2005 survey from The Economist on the global economy and more specifically on the savings glut itself (see also the link above) gives a very good initial description of the role of demographics. The survey links the phenomenon of global ageing to the economic theory of life-cycle operationalized specifically in Franco Modigliani's life-cycle hypothesis in order to argue that, at least, one of the factors driving the state of global savings is demographics. I personally think this is a very important point and as such I am also inclined to take the explanation one step further. The main underlying point is that demographics in fact have a lot to do with international capital flows and crucially that this demands we take a very close look at the dynamics of investment and savings in individual domestic economies. A tantalising question then becomes what in fact determines whether a country is running a surplus or deficit on the external balances and crucially whether in fact global macroeconomic imbalances are a proxy for global demographic imbalances? This also brings into question the whole idea and nature of a rebalancing process.

The three points above pretty much sums up the range of views on global macroeconomic imbalances as the debate is packaged today albeit with my own personal gripe that demographics are not often not given sufficient importance at the time of setting up the problem

As can readily be seen seen a lot still remains to be done, as the phenomenon is still hardly a well understood one, and one of the roles of contributors here at GEM will be to follow this issue and debate closely and build on what has already been achieved. My argument here is also based on the important implicit assumption that we cannot and should not seek to present a mono-causal explanation for the phenomenon. The issue and related dynamics are far too complex to be available for encapsulation in one single explanation, but rather we should be trying to weight and and determine the relative importance all the relevant factors which are associated with the hypotheses being advanced. Finally, it is perhaps already clear that I believe demographics represent one of the most important (and normally ill-explored) cornerstones here. As such, I am somewhat driven by my own personal intuitions and as we move along I will among other things dig deeper and explain why I think what I do. However, I can assure you that there are other views present amongst the contributors at GEM which will give mine and others' belief in demographics due challenge and counterbalance. The key point would be that this phenomenon is relatively new, and no-one has all the answers or a monopoly on truth, which is why it is so important that everything is explicitly debated. The need for just this debate is, at the end of the day, the principal reason why this new forum has been created.

* Figure 1 - p. 49. IMF paper on Europe and Global Imbalances, 22/9-2006 - (linked above).

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Special Feature, The German Economy At A Glance

Welcome to the Global Economy Matters Blog. Below you will find the normal chronological blog posts. But first here is our Monthly Special Feature which in January 2008 focuses on Germany. Here you will find charts which provide background data on the German economy. We hope these will be of some help to the first time reader here, making it easier to contextualise, assess and get to grips with the general argument being presented on the blog. The big question which arose concerning the Germany economy in 2007 was whether or not the new found dynamism in German economic activity constituted some form of remaissance, and formed part of a global decoupling process whereby a sustainable recovery in domestic demand was taking place. Analysts on this blog never really accepted this view. The key question and central enigma associated with the German economy is really why domestic demand should have remained so congenitally weak over such a considerable period of time.

Since this phenomenon is also to be observed in the the two other societes with very high (circa 43) population median ages - Italy and Japan - we postulate that demographics and population ageing processes offer some part of the explanation here.

Basically what we can observe as societies move above the 40 median age mark are a number of stylised facts. Weakness in domestic private consumption would be one of these, absence of consumer credit driven property booms would be another, growing pressure on the national debt as the elderly dependence ratio steadily rises would be another, and growing dependence on export growth for sustaining GDP growth would be the central feature of the whole edifice.

We hope you will find the background data presented here useful in assessing the argument which we are presenting on this blog, which is basically that a key component in the longer term growth stagnation from which Germany is suffering has its roots in the underlying demographics. Basically and in the long run (possibly with a 30 year lag) fertility does matter. Please click on thumbnails for better viewing.




What follows is a very rough and ready attempt to describe in broad brush strokes how the contemporary German economy actually works. First off, and as is well known, German society is ageing, and at the same time the German population has started declining. Not only is Germany's median age rising, the proportion of the population in the key 25-49 age group is now falling.






As can be seen from the chart this crucial age group touched its highpoint in 1997/98. This could be thought of as the moment of maximum capacity for the German economy since it includes the crucial 25 to 40 household-former, first-time-homebuyer group. In terms of credit expansion, it is this group which drives a significant part of internal demand.




The age group also includes another important group, the 35 to 50 years one. This group drives an economy in productive terms, since these are the prime age workers. If you think of a society as a 100 metres sprint athlete, then there is an age when this athlete is at the maximum of his or her running potential, an age after which each time they can only run the 100 metres more slowly.





Well a society is the same in terms of its collective economic potential, without addressing underlying issues either through fertility or immigration, it can only move forward more and more slowly. Consumption becomes flat, and GDP growth - gioven the external dependence - fragile.





Private consumption has hovered pretty close to the 60% mark for many years now, while government consumption - after moving sharply upwards as a total share in the first half of the 1970s has subsequently remained pretty constant, moving around the 19% of GDP mark. The big difference has been in the importance of fixed capital formation (GFCF) which reached from 1975 to 2000hovered around the 22 - 24% of GDP mark.





Prior to 1975 GFCF was at a much higher level, while post 2000 it has dropped substantially And So what we can see is that the year between, say, 1975 and 2000, when GFCF remaind a more or less constant share of GDP, constituted - to use the language of neo-classical economics - the constant growth period of the German domestic economy.The years prior to 1975 were the convergence, or "catch-up" years



And especially the 1960s, after Germany finally broke out of the destruction and devastation of WWII - while the years after 2000 constitute what the neo-classicists would call the "balanced growth period", although as we can see, it isn't very balanced, and there certainly isn't a steady state.







2008 Forecasts: There is a consenus at the present time that the German economy is slowing. Where there is no real consensus is over the rate at which it is slowing and where and when it will settle. It is clear that GDP growth in 2007 will be below the heady 3.1% annual rate achieved in 2006. The OECD last December revised their 2007 German forecast down to 2.6%, and their 2008 one down to 1.8%. The IMF in their October World Economic Outlook forecast growth for 2007 at 2.4%, slowing to 2% in 2008. Morgan Stanley's Elga Bartsch, while optimistic that the German economy will whether the credit crunch better than most (and here she may well be right) is somewhat more sanguine, putting 2008 growth at 1.5%. In general though I rather doubt her overview that "Germany could well be on the way to becoming the new growth locomotive in Europe." and especially her suggestion that "the phase of underperformance in terms of GDP growth, which has plagued Europe’s largest economy for years, is clearly over." Unfortunately, what we are arguing on this blog is that Germany's GDP growth rates since the mid 1990s are not some special kind of "underperformance", but what can be expected from a society with a rapidly rising median age which is increasingly dependent on exports rather than domestic consumption for growth.



The EU commission in it's November 2007 forecast was also convinced that the German economy was now on a "solid growth path", forecasting 2.5% growth for 2007 and 2.1% for 2008.

I personally will be very surprised if we see growth in the region of 2% for the German economy in 2008, and I even consider the 1.8% from the OECD and 1.5% from Morgan Stanley still on the high side given the extent of downside risk. Basically the reasonably favourable depreciation rules which currently apply to German investment have been changed as of 1 January 2008, and we might reasonably expect to see some sort of impact on investment comparable with the negative shock which hit private domestic consumption following the VAT rise on 1 Jan 2007. In addition all the indications suggest that German consumption will continue to be weak in 2008. So if consumer consumption is at best flat, governemnt consumption equally so, and investment and construction weakening, we are simply lefy with export growth, and here the outlook is definitely more negative in 2008 than it was in 2007. The Spanish economy (one important German customer) is visibly wilting by the day, as is the UK (another big customer), but it is to Eastern Europe we must look for the biggest impact on German exports of any correction in 2008. Just one data point should suffice, Germany exports roughly the same value of goods to the Czech Republic (and more to Poland) as it does to China. This means that Geramny is proportionately not that exposed to any slowdown in China, but hugely exposed to any sudden shift in growth and demand in the East of Europe.

So I would say, that on current data, 1% growth in Germany in 2008 look a reasonable estimate at this point, but that this needs to be taken to mean with considerable downside risk. Germany is now tremendously dependent on what happens elsewhere, and until what does actually happen elsewhere becomes clearer it is difficult to be more precise on Germany.

The only apparent bright spot on the horizon is employment, but I am dubious that in the context of Germany's ageing workforce this will work through as some are hoping, as I expain at some considerable length in this post here. My opinion is that Germany will enter recession at some point during 2008, and that we may well have 2 consecutive quarters of negative growth. The continuing high euro will maintain pressure on German exports, and high oil and food prices will maintain pressure on the inflation front, at least in the first half of 2008. The ECB will probably switch stance towards rate reductions at some point, but since, as Elga Bartsch among many others so eloquently argues German internal consumption and investment are not especially dependent on credit conditions, easing from the ECB may not have as much impact as one would hope for.



Key Posts For Understanding The Present Path of the German Economy

Is The German Economy Heading For Recession in 2008?


Employment and Unemployment in Germany January 2008

Germany Economy, What Price the VAT Effect Now!

The German Economy, Employment, Export Shares and Age Structure

Structural Aspects of German Export Dependence

Does NeoClassical Steady State Growth Really Exist?